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ARE STRONG STATES KEY TO REDUCING VIOLENCE? A 
TEST OF PINKER 
RYAN MURPHY* 
STEVEN PINKER CLAIMS in The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011) that 
nearly all social-scientific evidence tells us violence is declining. This paper 
makes no claims against Pinker’s main argument; criticisms of it having been 
addressed elsewhere (Pinker 2015). However, one secondary hypothesis 
Pinker puts forward is that the development of strong states was a key factor 
in the decline of violence (2011, 42). Summarizing his reading of the 
evidence, Pinker writes, “[t]he reduction of homicide by government control 
is so obvious to anthropologists that they seldom document it with 
numbers… It goes without saying that people that have been brought under 
the jurisdiction of a government will not fight as much, so they are simply 
excluded from studies in indigenous societies” (2011, 55–56). While Pinker 
cites one survey of traditional societies that finds that before World War I 
such societies were frequently more violent,1 he otherwise deems the 
connection between the rise of states and the decline of violence obvious and 
uncontroversial. 
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1 According to the authors of the survey, this measure of violence is meant to proxy 
for “the influence of colonialism, inclusion of the society in world market economy, and 
other forces that should directly affect the ability of kin groups to act as vengeance-
seeking units” (Ericksen and Horton 1992, 71). 
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Pinker’s hypothesis that the development of strong states played an 
important role in reducing violence can be addressed using the same types of 
simple empirical tests found elsewhere in his book. The closest such test 
Pinker provides is reproduced as Figure 1, where he shows, drawing from a 
variety of sources, that even the most peaceful indigenous (nonstate) societies 
had homicide rates as high as the ten largest American cities in 1990 (which 
were much higher than they have been recently). 
 
Figure 1: Homicide rates in the least violent nonstate societies compared to state societies. 
On the other hand, some scholars have argued that the market is as 
effective as or more effective than states at providing public goods such as 
criminal justice (e.g., Peden 1977; Friedman 1979; Leeson 2007). Elsewhere 
in his book, Pinker provides myriad scatterplots and trend lines to further his 
arguments.2 The purpose of this paper is to surpass the quality of the 
comparison Pinker makes between state and nonstate societies to bring the 
quality to that of the other comparisons of his book. I run a series of simple 
regressions using measures of degrees of government as the explanatory 
variable to explain country-level homicide rates in developing countries. I 
then modestly improve on the quality of the empirical test by including 
certain control variables. While these parsimonious specifications are weak 
tests of causality, they are strictly better tools than trend lines or scatterplots.3 
                                                          
2 To be fair, while doing so he also cites other scholars who perform more 
sophisticated analyses. 
3 Pinker’s primary hypothesis relates the passing of time with declines in violence. 
The empirical evidence that takes the form described above is similar to Figure 1 (though 
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To perform this analysis, I use the World Bank Development 
Indicators’ international homicides (per 100,000 people) data for lower-
income countries (from 2012, 2011, or 2010, using the most recent available). 
I use these data because homicide rates in less developed countries reflect the 
factors led to elevated homicide rates in the now-developed world prior to 
the period when rates declined. If a single variable—the rise of the state—
contributed to the decline in violence as much as Pinker argues, such a 
relationship should also be present to at least some extent cross-sectionally in 
developing countries in the modern world. Although the modern world in 
less developed countries differs greatly from, for example, Europe two 
centuries ago, this approach allows for the execution of simple econometric 
methods that are suggestive, if imperfect.4  
While the data quality on homicide rates often raises suspicions, this 
type of data comprises the backbone of the empirics found in Pinker’s book. 
Furthermore, identifying relationships between institutions and international 
homicide rates is certainly possible in general (see, e.g., Stringham and 
Levendis 2010, Bjornskov 2015). I use three measures of the strength of 
government: Worldwide Governance Indicators from the World Bank, Polity 
IV from the Center for Systemic Peace, and government consumption as a 
percentage of GDP from World Development Indicators. Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (an average of which I used to create a single 
measure) can be interpreted as government effectiveness, state capacity (i.e., 
the ability of a state to marshal resources and perform tasks should it choose 
to do so), or the quality of bureaucracy (see, e.g., Fukuyama 2014). The Polity 
IV index measures the strength of democratic institutions across countries. 
Therefore, regardless of whether we conceive of the state in terms of its raw 
size, its ability to perform various functions, or its modern, democratic 
character, the empirical tests here capture the relevant facts. 
As a control variable, I use gross nominal income (most recent 
available) from World Development Indicators. I also use the Gini 
coefficient, a measure of inequality, from the most recently available year as 
                                                                                                                                     
less rudimentary) as well as, in Pinker (2011), figures 2-2, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-7, 3-10, 3-
12, 3-13, 3-14, 3-15, 3-16, 3-18, 3-19, and others. Taking this evidence together, I do not 
object to Pinker’s conclusion. However, regarding the relationship between violence and 
the presence of the state, this paper finds Pinker’s argument to lack similar empirical 
support. 
4 This approach is consistent with Pinker’s and others’ use of anthropological 
scholarship on present-day societies to study societies in the distant past. This usage is 
what Figure 1, for example, implies. 
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found in the World Income Inequality Database (UNU-WIDER 2015). Table 
1 provides descriptive statistics for each of the control variables as well as for 
the variables of interest.5 Studies frequently find the Gini coefficient to have a 
positive statistical relationship with the homicide rate (as in Stringham and 
Levandis 2010), while gross national income (GNI) is a measure of economic 
development that covers an extensive number of lower-income countries. 
 
These control variables, in addition to regional dummies6 (variables 
which account for characteristics specific to parts of the world) are the only 
controls in this paper. Other analyses using homicide rates sometimes have 
more controls, but the point in this argument is that methods that are as 
strong as or stronger than those Pinker employs do not support the 
secondary hypothesis I consider here. 
Table 2 provides baseline results for both lower-income and lower-
middle-income countries. Each regression employs robust standard errors. I 
place each variable measuring the strength of government (Polity IV, 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, and government consumption as a 
percentage of GDP) in a simple regression explaining homicide rates. 
Following each simple regression, I also add gross nominal income, the Gini 
coefficient, and the regional dummies. To reiterate, the point of these 
                                                          
5 In this table, the homicide rate is the variable with the largest sample, even though 
it covers the fewest number of countries. This is because, since I knew in advance that it 
would be the binding constraint, I first compiled it and then matched the other data to it. 
6 The regional dummies correspond to Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe, and the 
Arab world; Oceania is omitted. 
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable           n  mean  stdev  min  max 
Homicides   79  10.366  12.333  0.6  90.4 
Polity    71  3.113  5.214  -9  10 
World Governance  70  0.320  0.107  0.083 0.61 
Indicators    
Government consum.      70  15.002  10.373  2.8  85.75 
as a % of GDP 
Log gross nominal  79  3.134  0.340  2.415 3.603 
income 
Gini coefficient  72  41.099  8.107  26.4  64.3 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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regressions is not to establish a deeply satisfying identification strategy but to 
provide a very basic test of the argument that the strength of governments is 
what drives the fall in violence in the countries that have not yet approached 
the stability and wealth of the developed world.7 I then replicate these 
specifications in Table 2 but omit lower-middle-income countries so as to 
focus only on the poorest countries. 
 
 
When I perform these tests, under no specification does the strength of 
government statistically significantly predict homicide rates. The point 
estimates of the relationship vary widely, giving us weak grounds for 
interpreting them at all. In some sense, these tests fail to reject the null 
hypothesis in very favorable circumstances: regressions 1, 3, and 5 are 
                                                          
7 Although identification is not the purpose of these exercises, it is worth noting that 
including an omitted variable that would show that governments reduce violence would 
be a bit counterintuitive. Variables correlated with stronger governments as defined here 
tend to be related to positive outcomes and prosperity (protection of property rights, 
education, etc.). If the reason why strong government is not related to less violence is that 
less violence is endogenous to such an omitted variable, it would imply that that omitted 
variable is causing more violence. 
TABLE 2. Strength of Governments and Homicide Rates—Lower- and Lower-Middle-Income 
Countries 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Polity IV   0.197  -0.135     
    (0.286) (0.217) 
World Governance     1.800  -10.700 
Indicators       (12.574) (10.650) 
Government consum.         0.024  0.134 
as % of GDP          (0.127) (0.125) 
Logged gross nominal   4.405    4.996    -0.092 
income     (4.497)   (3.920)   (4.930) 
Gini coefficient    0.380*   0.452*   0.465* 
      (0.225)   (0.258)   (0.248) 
Constant   10.357*** -22.841 10.218** -28.523 10.504*** -21.850 
    (1.310) (14.263) (4.483) (17.727) (2.148) (13.177) 
Regional dummies? N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
𝑅2    0.006  0.365  0.000  0.378  0.000  0.417 
n    71  68  70  68  70  68 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* denotes 10% confidence. ** denotes 5% confidence. *** denotes 1% confidence. Robust standard 
errors were employed and are provided parenthetically. 
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univariate regressions with seventy or more observations. In the absence of 
any other competing hypothesis (besides the null), these regressions, which 
allow the strength of the state to claim whatever portion of declines in 
homicide rates it is correlated with, do not support Pinker’s claim. 
 
 
While these tests are not robust econometrically and offer little 
evidence of causation, they are at least as rigorous as the graphs and time 
series Pinker marshals throughout his book. The central claim of his work—
that violence has declined—can be demonstrated persuasively using the data 
Pinker provides: if one does not impugn the data sources themselves, 
obtaining this result is almost a matter of arithmetic. But the circumstantial 
evidence and narrative Pinker employs provide much less support for his 
secondary hypotheses, such as the causal reasons for the decline in violence. 
Numerous books have provided explanations as to why the modern 
world has developed the institutions that allow nations to become richer, 
safer, and more educated (e.g., Diamond 1997; Fukuyama 2014; Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2012). The Better Angels of Our Nature succeeds in giving us 
reason to believe its central thesis. But this note provides some baseline 
evidence suggesting that when Pinker partakes in similar narrative 
explanations—for example, by crediting a strong state for the decline in 
violence—his argument may not withstand scrutiny. 
TABLE 3. Strength of Governments and Homicide Rates—Lower-Income Countries Only 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable   (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Polity IV   -0.292 -0.413     
    (0.236) (0.265) 
World Governance     -0.206 -11.539 
Indicators       (14.636) (17.342) 
Government consum.         0.028  -0.141 
as % of GDP          (0.145) (0.176) 
Logged gross nominal    -1.248   -0.957   -1.308 
income     (7.423)   (8.407)   (6.646) 
Gini coefficient    0.174    0.183    0.120 
      (0.118)   (0.203)   (0.126) 
Constant   9.579*** 2.294  8.914** 3.723  8.492*** 6.390 
    (1.104) (16.729) (4.600) (25.862) (2.130) (17.168) 
Regional dummies? N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
𝑅2    0.048  0.315  0.000  0.281  0.001  0.244 
n    30  29  29  29  29  28 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* denotes 10% confidence. ** denotes 5% confidence. *** denotes 1% confidence. Robust standard 
errors were employed and provided parenthetically. 
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